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Abstract
This article provides a selective review on the recent literature on econometric models
of network formation. The survey starts with a brief exposition on basic concepts and
tools for the statistical description of networks. I then offer a review of dyadic models,
focussing on statistical models on pairs of nodes and describe several developments of
interest to the econometrics literature. The article also presents a discussion of non-
dyadic models where link formation might be influenced by the presence or absence
of additional links, which themselves are subject to similar influences. This is related
to the statistical literature on conditionally specified models and the econometrics of
game theoretical models. I close with a (non-exhaustive) discussion of potential areas
for further development.
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1 Introduction
Tama´s Erde´lyi and John Cummings met in their first year of high school in Queens, New
York City. Sometime later, John met Doug Colvin, who had moved to the neighbourhood
from Germany where his father was stationed with the US Army. Together with a fourth
neighbourhood friend, Jeffrey Hyman, they formed a band in 1974 and took the name of
“The Ramones.”
Regardless of one’s opinion on the music by Johnny (John), Joey (Jeffrey), Dee Dee
(Doug) and Tommy (Tama´s) Ramone, their encounter was a matter of opportunity, talent
and personal affinity.1 Related factors inform the formation of networks in many other
settings, from friendships in economic and/or social contexts, to the establishment of business
relationships across firms and trading ties between countries. These links influence and are
facilitated by other outcomes that depend on how a particular group is connected. For
example, smoking behaviour among adolescents influences and is affected by whom they are
related to. Production decisions are similarly influenced by the set of clients and suppliers
for a firm. Especially with the advent and availability of data on networks from surveys
and administrative sources, it is increasingly feasible and potentially relevant to provide a
systematic assessment of drivers and correlates for the formation of such relationships.
In this article I review recent developments in the nascent literature on the econo-
metrics of networks that provide a means to assess those drivers and correlates. While an
established literature exists in other fields, spanning social sciences, physics and statistics, I
focus here on tools related to the field of economics. Much of it builds and gets inspiration
from previous developments in other fields, but some of it is quintessentially related to re-
search in economics. This is the case, for instance, of estimable models of strategic network
formation.
I start with a brief exposition on basic concepts and tools for the (statistical) descrip-
1The off-stage personal relationships were not harmonious for long. Nevertheless, “ ‘I can
see now how it was only natural that I would gravitate toward Tommy, Joey, and Johnny Ra-
mone,’ he wrote. ‘They were the obvious creeps of the neighbourhood . . . ’ ” quoting
Dee Dee Ramone by “The Curse of the Ramones” (Rolling Stone, May, 2016 retrieved from
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/the-curse-of-the-ramones-165741/).
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tion of networks. I then offer a review of dyadic models and describe several developments
of interest to the econometrics literature and connections with related literatures (e.g., panel
data). This is followed by a discussion of non-dyadic models, where link formation might
be influenced by the presence or absence of additional links, which themselves are subject
to similar influences. This is related to the statistical literature on conditionally specified
models and the econometrics of game theoretical models. As in those literatures, potential
simultaneity issues are central to the identification and estimation of the quantities of inter-
est and I explore some of those here as well. I close with a (non-exhaustive) discussion of
potential areas for further development.
This review complements other available overviews within econometrics by Graham
(2015), Chandrasekhar (2015), de Paula (2017) and Graham (forthcoming). In particular, it
follows closely (but expands upon) previous surveys in de Paula (2017) and corresponding
material in Graham and de Paula (2020).
2 Preliminary Foundations
Networks are typically represented by graphs. A graph g is a pair of sets (Ng, Eg) of nodes
(or vertices) Ng and edges (or links or ties) Eg. I will denote the number of elements in
these sets by |Ng| ≡ N and |Eg|, respectively. Vertices here represent economic agents
like individuals, households or firms. An edge represents a link or connection between two
nodes in Ng. A graph is undirected when Eg is the set of unordered pairs with elements
in Ng, say {i, j} with i, j ∈ Ng. (I abstract away from self-links here.) An example are
(reciprocal) informal risk-sharing networks based on kinship or friendship (e.g., Fafchamps
and Lund (2003)). To accomodate directional relationships, edges are best modeled as
ordered pairs, say (i, j) ∈ Ng ×Ng. These graphs, known as directed graphs (or digraphs),
are more adequate for handling relatioships that do not require reciprocity or for which
direction carries a particular meaning, as in a supplier-client relationship in a production
network (e.g., Atalay, Hortacsu, Roberts, and Syverson (2011)). Generalizations allow for
weighted links, perhaps representing distances between two individuals or the intensity of
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a particular relationship. Such weights can be represented as a mapping from the space of
pairs (unordered or ordered) into the real line.
A common representation of a graph is through its |Ng| × |Ng| adjacency matrix W ,
where each line represents a different node. The components of W mark whether an edge
between nodes i and j (or from i to j in a digraph) is present or not and possibly its weight
(in weighted graphs). The adjacency matrix allows one to translate combinatorial operations
into linear algebraic ones and can be quite useful in several settings. For an adjacency matrix
W to a simple unweighted graph (i.e., no self-links and at most one link between any pair of
nodes), the ij element of matrix W k, k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}, for instance, produce the number
paths of length k between i and j. Two graphs are said to be isomorphic if their adjacency
matrices can be obtained from each other, through multiplication by a permutation matrix,
for example. This corresponds to a relabeling of the vertices in the corresponding graphs.
2.1 Vertex Features
Various measures can then be defined to characterize a particular vertex in the graph, to
relate two or more vertices on a graph, or to represent a global feature of the graph at hand.
In what follows I focus on simple, unweighted graphs for ease of exposition. An important
characteristic for a particular vertex i, for example, is the set of neighbours incident with
that vertex in a graph g, denoted by Ni(g). The cardinality of this set is known as the
“degree” of that node, and one can then talk about the relative frequency of degrees in a
given graph as a whole. (In directed graphs, one can further distinguish “in-degrees” and
“out-degrees” relating to inward and outward edges from and to a given node.) A “dense”
graph, for instance, is one in which nodes display a lot of connections, and a common
measure of density is the average degree divided by |Ng|− 1, which is the maximum number
of possible links available to any given node. It is common to define the (geodesic) distance
between these two as the shortest path between those two nodes. A graph is then said to be
connected if the distance between any two vertices is finite (i.e., there is at least one path
between those nodes).
One can also define various measures to characterize the typical subnetwork structure
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around a given vertex. For brevity, I only mention a basic taxonomy of such measures as
specific definitions are available in most introductory texts on the subject (see, for example,
the excellent overview in Jackson (2009)). A network aspect of particular interest in social
settings is the degree of “clustering” in the system, intuitively summarized by the propensity
that two neighbours to a given node are also themselves directly linked. Theoretically, for
example, it may be easier for clustered individuals to coordinate on certain collective actions
since clustering may facilitate common knowledge (Chwe (2000)) and different clustering
metrics are available to quantify this feature in a network.
Another feature of potential interest in economic and social networks is the degree of
“centrality” of a given vertex, and various measures of centrality are also available. Those
aim at characterizing how important a given node is in comparison to the remaining nodes
in g. Aside from how connected a given vertex is (degree centrality) or how far on average a
vertex is from any other vertex in the network (closeness centrality), one can also compute
the betweenness centrality, illustrating how crucial a given node is in connecting individuals.
Another family of popular centrality measures summarises a node’s centrality in reference
to its neighbours centrality (more on this later). The simplest of these measures is the
eigenvector centrality (a.k.a. Gould’s index of accessibility), corresponding to the dominant
eigenvector of the adjacency matrix (Gould (1967), Bonacich (1972)). If an individual is
central because she is connected with central individuals, this means that the (eigenvector)
centrality vector c is such that c = Wc. It is thus the eigenvector related to a unit eigenvalue.
For a normalised adjacency matrix where all rows add up to one, this is guaranteed to exist
and be unique if the network is (strongly) connected by the Perron-Frobenius Theorem.
Variations on this centrality measure include, for example, the Google’s PageRank index
(Brin and Page (1998)). Among the most popular metrics in this family were those proposed
by Katz (1953) and Bonacich (1987). The Katz centrality of a node i can be motivated by
ascribing a value of β˜k > 0 to each connection reached by a walk of length k. If one adds up
the weights for each individual, one has a centrality measure for each individual given by the
components of the vector β˜W1+ β˜2W 21+ β˜3W 31+ . . . If β˜ is below the reciprocal of W ’s
largest eigenvalue, we can write the above as β˜(I − β˜W )−1W1, where β˜ is a small enough
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positive number. The Bonacich centrality generalizes this formula to a two-parameter index
defined by the vector α(I− β˜W )−1W1. Such measures turn out to play an important role in
the analysis of games and dissemination on networks (e.g., Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and
Zenou (2006) and the survey by Zenou (2015)).
2.2 Random Graphs
Letting G be a particular set of graphs, one can define a probability model on this sample
space. These models can and usually are indexed by features common to the graphs in G,
like the number of vertices and/or other motifs.
Regardless of the generative model one has in mind, the initial examination of a
network typically involves the characterisation of some of the features alluded to above,
such as the links pattern among node pairs, triads, tetrads and k-tuples in general, usually
referred to as a dyad or triad census in the first two cases. Isomorphic graphs on the k-tuple
of nodes are usually classified within the same equivalence class. For example, in a dyad
from a digraph, a pair with one link will be classified equivalently whether the link is from
i to j or from j to i. Thus, if the network is directed, there are three patterns of subgraphs
on pairs: no link, one unreciprocated link from one of the nodes to the other one or two
reciprocated links. In an undirected network two patterns exist for a pair of nodes: either
those two vertices are connected or not. In triads, an undirected network will feature four
patterns: zero, one, two or three links. A directed network will produce a richer set with
16 triad patterns. The number of patterns grows rapidly with k and, in a directed network,
“there are so many tetrad types (218) and pentad types (9608) that a k-subgraph census for
k ≥ 4 is often more cumbersome than the original sociomatrix.” (Holland and Leinhardt
(1976)).2
One of the early network models imposes a uniform probability on the class of graphs
with a given number of nodes, |Ng|, and a particular number of edges, |Eg|, for g ∈ G
(see Erdo¨s and Re´nyi (1959) and Erdo¨s and Re´nyi (1960)). Another basic, canonical ran-
2Expressions for the first two moments of such k-subgraph censuses appear in Holland and Leinhardt
(1976) and further asymptotic results under additional assumptions on the link formation probabilities
feature in Bickel, Chen, and Levina (2011) and Bhattacharya and Bickel (2015).
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dom graph model is one in which the edges between any two nodes follow an independent
Bernoulli distribution with equal probability, say p. For a large enough number of nodes
and sufficiently small probability of link formation p, the degree distribution approaches a
Poisson distribution, and the model is consequently known as the Poisson random-graph
model. This class of models appears in Gilbert (1959) and Erdo¨s and Re´nyi (1960) and has
since been studied extensively. While simple to characterise, it fails to reproduce important
dependencies observed in social and economic networks. One category of models that aims
at a better representation of the regularities usually encountered in social systems involves
models where nodes are incorporated into the graph sequentially and form ties more or less
randomly. One such model is the “preferential attachment” model (Baraba´si and Albert
(1999)), whereby the establishment of new links is more likely for higher-degree existing
nodes, producing degree distributions with Pareto tails (as well as other regularities usually
observed; see the presentation in Jackson (2009) or Kolaczyk (2009) for a more thorough
exposition).
Another alternative is to rely on more general (static) random graph models that
explicitly acknowledge the probabilistic dependencies in link formation. Frank and Strauss
(1986), for example, focus on random graphs where two (random) edges that do not share a
vertex are conditionally independent given the other remaining (random) edges. It reflects
the intuition that ties are not independent of each other, but their dependency arises only
through those who are directly involved in the connections in question. This, and a homo-
geneity assumption (i.e., that all graphs that are the same up to a permutation of vertices
have the same probability), delivers that
P(G = g) ∝ exp
(
α0t+
∑
k=1
αksk
)
,
where t is the number of triangles (completely connected triples of vertices) and sk is the
number of k-stars (tuples of k + 1 vertices where one of the vertices has degree k and the
remaining ones have degree one). (Notice that the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model is a specific case of the
above model, where α0 = α2 = · · · = αk = 0.) This structure suggests a class of probabilistic
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models that reproduce the exponential functional form above even in cases where the exact
properties used by Frank and Strauss do not hold. Those models are such that P(G = g) ∝
exp (
∑p
k=1 αkSk(g)) , where Sk(g), k = 1, . . . , p enumerate features of the graph g. These
would be characteristics like the number of edges, the number of triangles and possibly
many others. These models are known as exponential random graph models (ERGMs)
(or p∗ models in the social sciences literature, see Robins, Pattison, Kalish, and Lusher
(2007)) and can be extended beyond undirected random graphs. The models above form an
exponential family of distribution over (random) graphs and exponential distributions (e.g.,
Bernoulli, Poisson) have well-known probabilistic and statistical properties. For example,
the vector (S1(g), . . . , Sp(g)) constitute a p-dimensional sufficient statistic for the parameters
(α1, . . . , αp).
Some recent articles in econometrics are closely related to the exponential random
graph model above. More generally, all the models above (and many others) are presented in
detail elsewhere (e.g., Bolloba´s (2001), Jackson (2009), Kolaczyk (2009)) and I will selectively
discuss features and difficulties as they arise in the literature reviewed here.
3 Dyadic Models
As their name suggests, dyadic models offer a statistical framework centred on node pairs.
In the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model on |Ng| = N vertices, the class of probability distributions over
possible networks, P , is indexed by the probability p ∈ (0, 1) that a link is formed (indepen-
dently) between any two nodes. Zheng, Salganik, and Gelman (2006), for example, used a
heterogeneous version of this simple random graph model to obtain estimates for the total
size of hard-to-count populations. Observed heterogeneity has also been incorporated via
dyadic models that expand on this model just as a probit or logit model generalise a simple
Bernoulli statistical model:
Wij = 1(X
>
ijβ + ij ≥ 0),
which can be used on directed or undirected settings. The covariates, Xij, involve individual-
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specific variables as well as variables defined for the pair (like geographic distance) or
aggregating individual variables into pair-specific quantities.3 For example, the metric
f(Xi, Xj) = |Xi − Xj| between sender and receiver is usually of interest and gathers how
relevant similarity (or homophily) in those variables is for link formation. (The coefficient
on Xij is sometimes called the “homophily parameter” by certain authors in the statistics
literature.) Other pairwise functions possibly used include the inner product or projection
functions, though others can also be devised. Whereas estimates can be obtained by usual
methods (e.g., likelihood, method of moments), inference in this context typically pays spe-
cial attention to potential correlations across pairs. If there are individual factors that are
common to all observations related to a given node, dyads will not be independent and
E(ijkl) is potentially nonzero when i = k, j = l, i = l or j = k. In a linear regression model,
Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), for example, suggest the following robust variance estimator:
1
N −K (X
>X)−1
(∑
i,j,k,l
mijkl
2N
Xij ˆij ˆklX
>
kl
)
(X>X)−1,
where the matrix X stacks the dyadic covariates and mijkl is one when i = k, j = l, i = l or
j = k and zero, otherwise. They also discuss standard errors for the logit (see their footnote
7) and additional examination is provided in Cameron and Miller (2014).4
It is possible to extend the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model to incorporate other features. Consider,
for example, the well-known p1 dyadic model offered by Holland and Leinhardt (1981) for
directed networks. Their model, which also belongs to the exponential family, postulates
that:
P(Wij = Wji = 1) ∝ exp(αrec + 2α + αouti + αini + αoutj + αinj ) (1)
3In a recent article, Comola and Fafchamps (2017) extend the model to accommodate misreport-
ing/discordance of elicited links by the individuals involved, which is not uncommon in survey-based network
data.
4Related works, focussing on linear models, are Aronow, Samii, and Assenova (2015) and Tabord-Meehan
(forthcoming).
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and
P(Wij = 1,Wji = 0) ∝ exp(α + αouti + αinj ). (2)
Here, the parameter αouti encodes the tendency of node i to send out links irrespective of the
target (its “gregariousness”), and αinj captures node j’s tendency to receive links regardless of
the sender’s identity (its “attractiveness”). Since they regulate individual link probabilities,
these parameters drive heterogeneity in individual (in and out) degrees across agents in
the group. They also influence how dense or sparse the network tends to be: the more
negative those parameters are, the less likely a link is. The parameter αrec registers the
tendency for directed links to be reciprocated: large, positive values of αrec will increase the
likelihood of symmetric adjacency matrices. (Note that when αouti = α
in
i = α
rec = 0 for all
i, links form independently with probability given by exp(α)/(1 + exp(α)), and the model
would correspond to a logit.) Given an observed network, the authors suggest estimating
the model above by Maximum Likelihood and offer an iterative scaling algorithm to ease
computation, given the possibly large number of parameters to be estimated.
This model has been generalised and expanded upon. Hoff (2005), for example, con-
siders an augmented model where multiplicative interactions between individual unobserved
factors are added to the probability specification above (i.e., zi × zj, where zi is a vector of
i-specific factors), and those plus the additive “gregariousness” and “attractiveness” features
defined previously (i.e., αouti and α
in
i ) are modeled as random effects. It is also possible to
add covariates, as done in the above mentioned article by Hoff (2005), who estimates his
model using Bayesian methods.
Dzemski (2018) focusses on such a model, where a link from node i to node j obeys:
Wij = 1(X
>
ijβ + α
out
i + α
in
j + ij ≥ 0),
where ij is a standard normal random variable. As in Holland and Leinhardt (1981), the
parameters αouti and α
in
j appear as fixed effects, hence allowing for an arbitrary correlation
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between those and with any observed characteristic in the model. Reciprocity in link forma-
tion is captured by a non-zero correlation ρ between ij and ji, which are jointly normal.
5
Otherwise, errors are independent across pairs. As pointed out in Graham (2017) (in an
undirected network framework), the presence of individual effects encoded in αouti and α
in
j
may obscure the identification and estimation of the “homophily parameter” β as a gre-
garious individual (i.e., high αouti ) will tend to send links indiscriminately, even if there is
a homophilous tendency (i.e., high, negative β on the distance between her and another
node on a particular feature X). It is important thus to control for those, should degree
heterogeneity reflect such sources of heterogeneity.
Because each of the N individuals has at her disposal N − 1 potential liaisons, the
setting is akin to a panel where both dimensions (“N” and “T”) are roughly comparable.
Dzemski thus uses tools from the (large-N, T ) panel data literature (see Fernandez-Val and
Weidner (2016) and Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2018)) to establish large sample proper-
ties for the estimator. When the network is sufficiently dense (i.e., the probability of link
formation between any two pairs does not vanish asymptotically), the Maximum Likelihood
estimator for β is such that
βˆ
a∼ N (β0 +BN , VN),
where the asymptotic bias BN disappears for large N and the variance decreases with N .
6
(Since there are N(N − 1) ordered pairs, the convergence rate is the usual parametric rate.)
Because the number of individual parameters is proportional to N , an incidental parameters
problem yields an asymptotic bias (see Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2018)). While the
estimator is consistent, the asymptotic bias matters for inference. He provides a test of
the model based on the prevalence of transitive triads (i.e., vertex triples where links are
transitive), which are not used in estimating it, and an application to the microfinance-
5One alternative is to follow Holland and Leinhardt (1981) and encode reciprocity in a parameter αrec.
This would lead to a model akin to Wij = 1(X
>
ijθ+α
out
i +α
in
j +α
recWji+ij ≥ 0). This model is nonetheless
compatible with multiple joint distributions for (Wij ,Wji) and, thus, “incomplete.” In this case, the model
is akin to a game between i and j and point-identification is not guaranteed (see de Paula (2013)). This is
not the case in the original model proposed by Holland and Leinhardt (1981) (see displays (1) and (2)), as
the probability distribution over (Wij ,Wji) is well-defined there.
6The estimate for ρ is obtained in a second step once the ML estimate for θ is available.
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related networks collected and analyzed in Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson
(2014).7
Yan, Jiang, Fienberg, and Leng (2019) provide a related analysis for a similar frame-
work, where the errors ij are independent (and ρ is thus zero) logistic random variables.
Under these conditions, the likelihood function for the model is given by
exp
(∑
i,j
wijX
>
ijβ + α
in>din + αout>dout − C(β, αin, αout)
)
, (3)
where C(β, αin, αout) ≡ ∑i 6=j ln (1 + exp (X>ijβ + αouti + αinj )) is a normalising constant and
αin, αout,din and dout are N dimensional vectors stacking the αini , α
out
i parameters, and in-
degree and out-degree sequences, respectively. They also rely on similar (though not iden-
tical) large N, T panel data manipulations to handle the incidental parameters bias in esti-
mating β, but pay special attention to the estimation of the individual specific parameters α.
Their setup relaxes some of the (non-)sparsity constraints in Dzemski (2018), which places
a lower bound on the likelihood of link formation (see above), allowing the α parameters to
drift in value at a lnN rate. Like that paper, they also demonstrate the performance of the
estimator in simulations and with empirical applications.
In sparser settings, where the errors ij are independent logistic random variables,
Charbonneau (2017) (and, for undirected networks, Graham (2017)8, see discussion below)
adapts insights from the nonlinear panel data literature on short (i.e., fixed T ) horizons going
back to Rasch (1960), to “difference out” the individual parameters in this logistic regression
(see, e.g., Section 5.1 in Arellano and Honore´ (2001)). The probability mass function for
links is the exponential family model in (3). Given the properties of the exponential family,
the in-degree and out-degree vectors din and dout are sufficient statistics for the parame-
ter vectors αin and αout. This means that the conditional probability for the edges Wijs
given those random vectors does not depend on the incidental parameters αin and αout, thus
7Interestingly, the estimated distribution of “gregariousness” and “attractiveness” appear to cluster in a
few groups, suggesting group-level heterogeneity.
8This article was previously circulated as “An Empirical Model of Network Formation: Detecting Ho-
mophily when Agents are Heterogeneous.”
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providing a (conditional) likelihood function. Unfortunately, such conditional likelihood is
computationally complex. It is nonetheless still possible to condition the incidental param-
eters out. Consider, for example, four generic vertices i, j, l and k. The idea is to focus on
the probability for one of the two configurations, A or B, in Figure 1 below conditional on
either one of the two patterns occurring.
It is not hard to see that the conditional probability that l sends a link to j (i.e.,
{Wlj = 1}) as in configuration A, given that only one of those links is in place (i.e., {Wlj +
Wlk = 1}) equals:
P(Wlj = 1|X, α,Wlj +Wlk = 1) =
exp[(Xlj −Xlk)>β + αinj − αink ]
1 + exp[(Xlj −Xlk)>β + αinj − αink ]
,
where X stacks the covariates to all the pairs involved. Note that the expression above does
not depend on αoutk . Likewise, the likelihood that i sends a link to j (i.e., {Wij = 1}), as in
configuration B, given that only one link is sent to either one of these potential counterparts
(i.e., {Wij +Wik = 1}) is
P(Wij = 1|X, α,Wij +Wik = 1) =
exp[(Xij −Xik)>β + αinj − αink ]
1 + exp[(Xlj −Xlk)>β + αinj − αink ]
,
which again does not depend on αouti . These equations look like a conventional panel logit
model with regressors X·j −X·k and αinj − αink as a fixed effect. A similar manipulation can
then be carried out focussing on the event that i sends a link to either k or j (but not both)
(i.e., {Wij +Wik = 1}), l sends a link to either k or j (but not both) (i.e., {Wlj +Wlk = 1})
and i and l do not send links to the same counterpart (i.e., {Wlj + Wij = 1}). Given this
13
event, the probability that l sends a link to j can be seen to be:
P(Wlj = 1|X, αin, αout,Wlj +Wlk = 1,Wij +Wik = 1,Wlj +Wij = 1) =
exp[((Xlj −Xlk)− (Xij −Xik))>β]
1 + exp[((Xlj −Xlk)− (Xij −Xik))>β] ,
where the individual parameters are no longer present! This strategy offers a (quasi-)likelihood
function that can be used to estimate of β. Since it does not depend on the incidental pa-
rameters, it is not restricted by the constraints on sparsity that the previous results rely on,
but uses fewer data points. Jochmans (2018) obtains the large sample properties for the
estimator thus defined. Under regularity assumptions, he shows that βˆ is asymptotically
normal (without the bias term) and ‖βˆ − β0‖ = Op([N(N − 1)pN ]−1/2), where pN is the
proportion of quadruples like those in Figure 1 that contribute to the estimation objective
function. Intuitively, the more of those there are, the more precise the estimator is. He
offers simulations where the performance of the (conditional) maximum likelihood estimator
defined above is shown to perform well even for sparser networks.
Graham (2017) investigates a similar model, also with observed covariates and logistic
idiosyncratic errors, but in an undirected network:
Wij = Wji = 1(X
>
ijβ + αi + αj + ij ≥ 0). (4)
There, the links are established with probability proportional to exp(β>Xij + αi + αj) and
can be interpreted as the outcome from a pairwise stable arrangement with transfers (see
discussion below). Here, the distinction between “sender productivity” and “receiver at-
tractiveness” for a given node is mute since the link is not directional, but the individual
parameters αi can be seen as the propensity by node i to establish connections. As in the
articles discussed above, they are also treated as fixed effects. In the absence of covariates,
this model was christened the β-model by Chatterjee, Diaconis, and Sly (2011), who anal-
yse its features. Yan and Xu (2013) establish the large sample properties for its maximum
likelihood estimator (for sufficiently dense networks). In the presence of covariates, Graham
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(2017) analyses the large sample properties for the maximum likelihood estimator for β (and
α) as in the articles above, but also offers a conditional maximum likelihood estimator for β
constructed using sufficient statistics for α, allowing him to “condition those parameters out”
and circumvent the incidental parameters problem estimating β. Similarly to the directed
case, the degree sequence here is such a sufficient statistic.9 As is the case there, the enu-
meration of possible degree sequence becomes computationally complex even at moderately
sized networks and Graham also relies on tetrads to offer a conditional maximum likelihood
estimator, the “tetrad logit,” that does not depend on the incidental parameters. The tetrad
logit estimator is asymptotically normal as N grows and able to tackle sparser models, albeit
at a slower convergence rate. While for dense models (where network density converges to a
constant as N grows), the convergence rate is parametric (‖βˆ−β0‖ = Op([N(N−1)/2)]−1/2),
it is Op([N(N − 1)/2]−1/4) for sparse network sequences where the density converges to zero
at a rate proportional to N .
Recent efforts have focussed on extending the models above in several directions. Toth
(2018) and Gao (forthcoming), for example, study semiparametric versions of the undirected
network model (4) without a distributional assumption on ij. Toth (2018) examines the iden-
tification and estimation of this variation of the model adapting ideas around Han (1987)’s
(semiparametric) maximum rank correlation estimator. Gao (forthcoming) studies the semi-
parametric identification of the model, but also discusses non-separable models where the
index X>ijβ + αi + αj + ij is replaced by more general forms like φ(Xij, αi, αj) + ij. Other
extensions veer a bit farther from model (4): Shi and Chen (2016), for example, examine
the estimation of a “double hurdle” model10 where
Wij = Wji = 1(X
>
ijβ + αi + ij ≥ 0)× 1(X>jiβ + αj + ji ≥ 0).
The condition above can be interpreted as a pairwise stability requirement on a model where
9This property is also used by Pelican and Graham (2019) to test for the presence of externalities in the
model, i.e., whether a link between two nodes depends on edges between those nodes and other vertices,
conditional on covariates and individual effects.
10Traditionally, multiple hurdle models refer to variations of Cragg (1971). In the binary outcome context,
the model is related to the “partially observable” model presented in Poirier (1980)
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individual utility from links depends additively on every direct connection and there are no
externalities (see discussion below). Here the link is observed whenever it is beneficial to
both parties involved, and not if it is detrimental to at least one of them. A related model
(without individual effects) is considered by Comola and Fafchamps (2014) to study whether
(directionally) elicited links are unilaterally or bilaterally formed.
4 Beyond Dyads
While dyadic models provide an important angle on the study of link formation, it is plausible
that a connection between two nodes depends on liaisons with other nodes in the group. In
a directed network, one such specification would be:
Wij = 1
(
γ
∑
k 6=j
Wjk + ij ≥ 0
)
, (5)
where for simplicity I abstract from covariates Xij and individual fixed effects α. The
individual link formation may also depend on the remaining connections in the network in
more general ways. Here, node i sends an edge to j taking into account those to whom j
links to (including whether j is connected to i). One relevant feature of the model above
is the econometric endogeneity issue from having
∑
k 6=jWjk as a covariate. If each of the
elements in this sum is simultaneously determined according to a expression like (5), this
covariate will be related to ij. This would require caution in using “partial information”
methods (focussed on dyadic likelihoods, for instance) to estimate the parameters above. It
might still nonetheless allow for the use of “full information” methods, if a joint distribution
for all the links is consistent with the conditionally specified model in (5). Importantly
though, such models are well known to be “incomplete”: they may not produce a unique
joint distribution for Wij, i, j = 1, . . . , N (see footnote 5). If there are only two nodes, for
example, W12 = 1 (γW21 + 12 ≥ 0) and W21 = 1 (γW12 + 21 ≥ 0). If γ is positive so that
there is a tendency to reciprocate links, there are realisations of 12 and 21 for which the
model predicts both (W12,W21) = (0, 0) and (W12,W21) = (1, 1) as solutions to this system
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of equations. In the statistical literature, this corresponds to the conditionally specified
model being “incompatible” (see Arnold and Press (1989)). In econometrics, such models
are referred to as “incomplete”, lacking a selection protocol between (W12,W21) = (0, 0)
and (W12,W21) = (1, 1) in the example above, for example, and commonly found in the
econometric study of strategic interactions with discrete actions (see de Paula (2013)).
A modelling alternative that avoids these issues relies on temporal restrictions and
postulates, for example, that
Wij,t = 1
(
ρWij,t−1 + γ
∑
k 6=j
Wjk,t−1 + ij,t ≥ 0
)
.
Here, the edge Wij,t between i and j in period t depends on lagged network features Wij,t−1
and
∑
k 6=jWjk,t−1, which are predetermined with respect to the innovation ij,t. When em-
pirically adequate, this specification circumvents the simultaneity issue and allows for the
addition of other covariates Xij,t, while requiring repeated observations on the network.
11 It
is also possible to include individual parameters α, though proper attention should be given
to the dynamic panel data nature of the setting in this case (see, e.g., Arellano and Honore´
(2001), Section 8, for the conventional panel data treatment). Such a model (with individual
effects) is indeed contemplated in Graham (2016), where similar conditioning arguments as
those in Charbonneau (2017) or Graham (2017), though conditional on different events, are
used to examine (semiparametric) identification and estimation on undirected networks.12
Another strategy to bypass the simultaneity issues referred to above is to model not
only dyads, but also triads, tetrads and more general k-tuples directly. Chandrasekhar and
Jackson (2016) propose one such framework, which they call subgraph generation model
(SUGM). It specifies a set of K subgraph classes, potentially involving more than two nodes
each and probabilities for each of these two nodes. If one has K = 2, for example, one of those
subgraph classes could be taken to be the possible graphs between two nodes and the second,
the possible networks among three vertices. One then forms subgraphs at random from each
11See also the related discussion of temporal lags in social interactions models and their identification by
Manski (1993), Section 4. Bramoulle´, Djebbari, and Fortin (2020) provide a review of that literature in this
volume.
12See also Han, Hsieh, and Ko (2019).
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of these classes among all the tuples in the group and the final network is obtained by taking
the union of all the edges thus sampled. Some of these edges may be redundant as a link
between two nodes could have appeared both as a draw from the two-node subgraph class and
the three-node one. The subgraphs may also get “meshed” together: a complete subnetwork
among nodes i, j and k could have arisen as a genuine such subgraph on that triad or three
independent complete graphs on the three pairs involving those three vertices. Disentagling
the count of subgraphs in the model that are genuinely formed or just happenstance from the
composition of other subgraphs can be done by noting that the counts of possible subgraphs
is a mixture of both genuinely and incidentally formed subgraphs. This renders a system of
equations that can then be solved for the parameters of interest and potentially matched to
moments for the desired parameters.
4.1 Strategic Formation Models
An alternative is to directly handle the challenges highlighted above. Since econometric
models with interacting agents are natural platforms where such difficulties arise, much
of the work speaking to such issues corresponds to estimable game theoretic frameworks.
(While the economic narrative is not as salient in the statistical models described previously,
many of those can also be interpreted through the lens of behavioural models.)
The first step in framing the network formation as a game involves a specification for
the set of players, their actions and payoffs. In the present setting, the players are represented
by the group of nodes Ng to be eventually connected in equilibrium, corresponding for
example to individuals, households or firms. Their actions are in turn related to the formation
of links. When the model is aimed at a directed network characterisation, actions encode
whether a node sends a link to another node. In undirected environments, on the other
hand, the connections might need to be agreed upon. For a given graph g ≡ (Ng, Eg)
designating how players are connected, a node i is assigned a network dependent payoff.
Whereas the payoff specification will depend on the context, a common parameterisation
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(on an undirected graph, see e.g. de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer (2018)) is given by:
Ui(g) ≡
∑
j 6=i
Wij ×
(
u+ ij
)
+
∣∣∪j:Wij=1Nj(g)−Ni(g)− {i}∣∣ ν +∑
j
∑
k>j
WijWikWjkω, (6)
where Wij = 1 if i and j are connected, Ni(g) denotes the set of nodes directly connected to
node i in the graph and | · | is the cardinality of a given set. The first term on the right-hand
side of (6) registers the payoff from direct connections and involves the parameter u and
idiosyncractic variables ij, unobserved by the econometrician. The second term encodes
the utility obtained from indirect connections:
∣∣∪j:Wij=1Nj(g)−Ni(g)− {i}∣∣ is the number
of individuals connected to direct couterparties of i, but not directly connected to her.
Finally, the last term summarises any benefits accruing from two direct connections also
being connected and induces incentives for “clustering,” a commonly observed phenomenon.
While I omit observable covariates in the expression above, the parameters (u, ν, ω) can also
be made to depend on those.
It is also important to clearly establish the information structure. In the literature
so far (and in accordance with the statistical models discussed above), it is often assumed
that information is complete so agents are informed about others’ (observed and unobserved)
payoffs and incentives perfectly. Incomplete information, albeit possibly more plausible and
epistemically more adequate in certain contexts, has less often been analysed in the literature.
Another feature of the environment that requires attention relates to transferability.
This refers to the possibillity for agents to transfer payoffs among themselves, not always
monetarily but also possibly through other means. When available, this possibility allows
nodes, for example, to bid for their preferred counterparties by accepting lower payoffs
themselves. At two opposite ends of the spectrum are non-transferable utility (NTU) models,
when there is no technology enabling agents to decrease their utility to benefit a potential
partner, and transferable utility (TU) models, which allows transfers of utility at a constant
“exchange rate” and the total gain from the matching (surplus) is what matters for stability
of the relationship.13 Which one is adopted again depends on the context at hand.
13Another possibility is the intermediate scenario with imperfect transferable utility (ITU) where trans-
fers are allowed, but at an “exchange rate” between individual utilities that is not constant and possibly
19
In closing the model, one then relies on a solution concept prescribing how individual
behaviours are aggregated to generate an equilibrium network. Whereas traditional concepts
in game theory (e.g., Nash equilibrium) can be envisioned and adapted to this case, the
theoretical literature has offered additional notions to better capture the peculiarities of
certain network formation contexts. When modelling undirected networks, for example,
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) propose pairwise stability as an alternative solution concept.
A network g is pairwise stable according to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) if any link present
in g is mutually beneficial and any absent link is detrimental to at least one of the parties
involved. More formally,
∀ij ∈ g, Ui(g) ≥ Ui(g−ij) and Uj(g) ≥ Uj(g−ij)
and
∀ij /∈ g, Ui(g) > Ui(g+ij) or Uj(g) > Uj(g+ij),
where ij ∈ (/∈) g signifies that the link between i and j pertains (not) to the set of edges in
g.14 The network g−ij is g without the link beween i and j and g+ij is the network g with the
link beween i and j. The theoretical literature has contemplated several variations to this
stability concept (e.g., pairwise Nash stability, strong stability, see the discussion in Jackson
(2009)) and Bloch and Jackson (2006) adapt this solution concept to an NTU environment.
For a given parameter vector and observable covariates, the model translates the
distribution of unobservable variables (e.g., ij) into a probability distribution over the equi-
librium sets for the game described above. Since this probability distribution is indexed by
the parameter vector, this delivers a statistical model on which one can in principle perform
estimation and inference. One difficulty in doing this is that there might be more than one
stable network for given parameter value and realisations of observable and unobservable
random variables. This is related to the statistical difficulties highlighted earlier in this
section and is potentially problematic for identification (i.e., the reverse mapping between
endogenous to the economic environment. While this would also be categorised as transferable utility, the
conventional terminology focusses on the constant “exchange rate” case (see Chiappori (2019)).
14This is related, but different from the stability concept typically used in “marriage market” models.
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observed distributions and parameters), computation and inference.
Another possibility is to rely on iterative procedures where the presence or absence of
links is evaluated as individuals or pairs take turns in a random meeting protocol as in the
“preferential attachment” framework mentioned earlier, where agents form links sequentially
and the establishment of new links is more likely with higher-degree existing nodes (see
Baraba´si and Albert (1999)).15 Before discussing models relying on the equilibrium notions
above, I will first discuss alternatives relying on iterative protocols.
4.1.1 Iterative Network Formation
Mele (2017), Christakis, Fowler, Imbens, and Kalyanaraman (forthcoming) and Badev (2018)
are notable examples of strategic network formation models based on a stochastic meeting
protocol whereby individuals or pairs sequentially revise their links. While such protocols are
not meant to be directly fit to the data, the random meeting sequences and unobservable er-
rors guiding the decisions to establish or interrupt connections lead to a potentially estimable
distribution over networks. Mele (2017) studies a directed network, and Badev (2018) ex-
pands the analysis there to the joint determination of links and behaviours.16 Christakis,
Fowler, Imbens, and Kalyanaraman (forthcoming), on the other hand, examine an undirected
network. The last two present empirical applications to links among adolescents using the
AddHealth data and Mele (forthcoming) applies the methodology in Mele (2017) to examine
segregation in high schools, also using AddHealth data.
Mele (2017) models a directed network where Wij = 1 if individual i offers a link to
individual j, and = 0, otherwise. The utility function for individual i is given by:
Ui(g) ≡
∑
j 6=i
Wiju
θ
ij +
∑
j 6=i
WijWjim
θ
ij +
∑
j 6=i
Wij
∑
k 6=i,j
Wjkν
θ
ik +
∑
j 6=i
Wij
∑
k 6=i,j
Wkiν
θ
kj,
15It pays to note that such stochastic revision processes are not unrelated to the (non-iterative) equilibrium
notions mentioned earlier and discussed below. For example, in a non-transferable utility setting, Jackson
and Watts (2002) demonstrate that a process where pairs meet sequentially and are offered to (myopically)
form or maintain links that are mutuallly beneficial and dissolve links that are not beneficial to at least one
of the parties involved converges to a pairwise stable network or a cycle.
16Mele (2017) was previously circulated as “A Structural Model of Segregation in Social Networks” (2015).
Previous versions for Badev (2018) appeared as “Discrete Games with Endogenous Networks: Theory and
Policy” (2013) and ”Discrete Games in Endogenous Networks: Equilibria and Policy” (2017).
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where uθij ≡ u(Xi, Xj; θ) represents the utility from directly linking to other individuals and
the first term involving νθij ≡ ν(Xi, Xj; θ) encodes the utility from indirectly linking to a
friend’s friend. These then play the same role as u and ν in the utility function previously
introduced. Since this is a directed network, mθij ≡ m(Xi, Xj; θ) marks the utility from a
mutual, reciprocated link. (In undirected networks, links are reciprocated by definition and
this term does not show up in the utility function presented earlier in this review.) The
second term involving νθij internalises some of the impact a link to individual j generates
for individuals that had offered links to i.17 Utility is non-transferable and information is
complete.
There is then a meeting sequence m = {mt}∞t=1, where mt = (i, j) means that i can
offer or dissolve a link to j in iteration t. Let P(mt = ij|gt−1, X) = ρ(gt−1, Xi, Xj), where gt−1
is the network in iteration t− 1. In addition, the meeting probability between i and j does
not depend on there being a link between them and each meeting has positive probability
of occuring (i.e., ρ(gt−1, Xi, Xj) = ρ(gt−1−ij , Xi, Xj) > 0,∀ij). This ensures that the likelihood
function from this model does not depend on the meeting protocol.
Finally, whenever i is offered a meeting with another node, it is supposed that she
receives idiosyncratic shocks (1, 0) to the utility of forming a link (Wij = 1) or not (Wij = 0).
An edge to j is established if and only if
Ui(W
t
ij = 1, g
t
−ij, X; θ) + 1t ≥ Ui(W tij = 0, gt−ij, X; θ) + 0t.
While there were no unobservable errors up to this point, once given the choice the decision
by i acts much like a standard random utility model over the remaining |Ng|−1 nodes. (This
implies that the average degree is roughly proportional to |Ng| and the model produces a
dense network.) This revision process then leads to subsequent additions and deletions of
edges where the resulting process forms a Markov chain on networks {gt}. In the absence
of unobservable shocks (i.e., if 0 and 1 are zero with probability one), the chain converges
17The author refers to this as popularity: “When an agent forms a link, he/she automatically creates an
indirect link for other agents that are connected to him/her, thus generating externalities and impacting
his/her ‘popularity.”’
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to one of the Nash equilibria for the game without s. Under the assumption that the s
are distributed independently (across time and links) and follow an Extreme Value Type I
distribution, it instead converges to a unique stationary distribution:
pi(g,X; θ) = exp[Q(g,X; θ)− C(θ)],
where C(θ) = ln{∑g′ exp[Q(g′, X; θ)]} and
Q(g,X; θ) =
∑
(i,j)
Wiju
θ
ij +
∑
(i,j)
WijWjim
θ
ij +
∑
(i,j,k)
WijWjkν
θ
ik.
As noted by the author, the Nash equilibria for the game with payoffs thus defined correspond
to the maxima of the function Q(g,X; θ).
This distribution can in principle be taken to data on either one or more networks.
In fact, the stationary distribution above describes an exponential random graph model, dis-
cussed previously in this survey. The model is estimated by Bayesian methods, producing a
posterior distribution over parameters of interest. One important difficulty with such models
is nonetheless the computation of the normalising constant C(θ) in pi(g,X; θ) as the sum-
mation is over all possible directed networks between the individuals in the group. With 10
individuals, for example, there are 290 ≈ 1027 such network configurations.18 This is relevant
above since it is necessary to compute such denominator to solve for the posterior distribution
either analytically or numerically (e.g., via simulations of the posterior distribution).
Alternative strategies to circumvent this issue or to approximate the denominator in
other settings include pseudo-likelihood methods (Besag (1975), Strauss and Ikeda (1990))
and variational principles (see Jordan and Wainwright (2008) and the recent article by Mele
and Zhu (2019) for an application in econometrics). These and other protocols are briefly
discussed in de Paula (2017). Mele (2017) instead handles it using simulation (Markov chain
Monte Carlo, MCMC) methods (see also Kolaczyk (2009) and references therein). The first
challenge is the computation of C(θ) for a given parameter value θ. Here, a (Metropolis-
18Similar issues also appear in models like those in display (3), which also belong to the exponential family.
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Hastings) algorithm to simulate the distribution of networks without the normalising con-
stant can be designed.
Unfortunately, this simulation protocol is itself not immune to problems. It is well
known, for example, that parameter changes in ERGMs may lead to abrupt changes in
probable graphs (see Snijders (2002)). In addition, in parameter regions where the distri-
bution over networks is multimodal, the convergence of the algorithm is impractically slow
for MCMC protocols where networks change only locally from iteration to iteration (see
Bhamidi, Bresler, and Sly (2011)). Here, the modes of the distribution will correspond to
the maxima of the function Q as highlighted previously, which are in turn related to the
Nash equilibria for the game discussed previously. Hence, while the stationary distribution
for the Markov process defined by the meeting protocol is unique, equilibrium multiplicity
is also a complicating computational feature here. To accelerate convergence, the article
suggests a simulation algorithm that updates networks at larger steps (see Appendix B.1 to
the article).
For parameter regions where the distribution is unimodal on the other hand, Bhamidi,
Bresler, and Sly (2011) and Chatterjee and Diaconis (2013) show that graph draws are
indistinguishable from a random network model with independent link formation (i.e., an
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model) or mixture of such models. Mele (2017) also shows that a similar
phenomenon occurs in a simplified version of his model, without covariates and positive
utility from mutual links (m > 0). This points to an identification issue when estimation
is based on a single network in this particular example.19 The result does not allow for
covariates, but the author conjectures that the sign of such externalities (on reciprocated
links) will remain relevant.
In the Bayesian estimation, one also needs to approximate the posterior distribution
for the parameters of interest. The “inner” simulation of the networks for a given parameter
vector discussed above is a component of the “outer” simulation protocol for the posterior
distribution presented in Mele (2017). Here too, the article follows a Markov chain Monte
19When multiple networks are used, identification is attaned with variation in sufficient statistics across
networks: “If the sufficient statistics are not linearly dependent, then the exponential family is minimal and
the likelihood is stricly concave, therefore the mode is unique.” (Mele (2017))
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Carlo procedure based on the exchange algorithm proposed by Murray, Ghahramani, and
MacKay (2006) to avoid the computation of the normalising constant. The model is taken
to data in Mele (forthcoming), where the author studies ethnic segregation in high schools
using data from AddHealth.
4.1.2 Non-Iterative Network Formation
An alternative strategy takes a non-iterative perspective where network formation is obtained
as a simultaneous move game with players as nodes/vertices and the action space as poten-
tial links. For example, Leung (2015b) studies a directed network formation model under
incomplete information and Bayes-Nash as the solution concept adapting (two-step) estima-
tion strategies commonly used in the econometrics on such games (see de Paula (2013)). He
employs the model to analyse trust networks in India.20 Also modelling a directed network,
Gualdani (2019) examines a complete information model employing Nash equilibrium as the
solution concept and studies board interlocks among firms. One important challenge in this
context relates to the dimensionality of potential networks and the article offers suggestions
to reduce the computational burden. I will here focus on works using pairwise stability
(without transferability).
One avenue is to adapt some of the strategies used in the empirical games literature.
To illustrate this, take the simplified directed network formation setting discussed previously
where there are two nodes, 1 and 2, and the payoff obtained by i = 1, 2 from a link to
j 6= i is given by: γ + ij if j also offers a link to i, and 12, otherwise. If i does not
send a link to j, her payoff is zero. The payoffs for j are analogously defined. A (Nash)
equilibrium for this game leads to an econometric model where W12 = 1 (γW21 + 12 ≥ 0)
and W21 = 1 (γW12 + 21 ≥ 0). As discussed earlier, if there is a tendency to reciprocate
links (i.e., γ is positive ), there are realisations of 12 and 21 for which the model predicts
both (W12,W21) = (0, 0) and (W12,W21) = (1, 1) as solutions to this system of equations.
While this does not tie down a single probability distribution for (W12,W21), it nonetheless
20An ealier working paper taking a similar modelling framework is Gilleskie and Zhang (2009), where the
authors also examine smoking behaviour among network members. Ridder and Sheng (2015) and Candelaria
and Ura (2018) are recent working papers also studying incomplete information network formation games.
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offers bounds on the probabilities for the possible realisations of this vector. The probability
for the event {(W12,W21) = (0, 0)} is minimized if (0, 0) is never selected when 12 and 21
are such that other possible equilibria exist. It is on the other hand maximised when (0, 0)
is always chosen when there are other possible solutions for those realisations of 12 and
21. These quantities thus bound the probability for the event {(W12,W21) = (0, 0)} and
those inequalities in turn provide information on the parameters guiding the data generating
process. Parameters that lead to lower probability bounds above or upper probability bounds
below the observed frequency in the data are not consistent with the generating process. At
the same time, more than one parameter will typically be consistent with the data rendering
the model “partially identified” (see Tamer (2010)).21
To illustrate how this translates with an alternative solution concept, consider, for
instance, an undirected network formation game among three individuals (|Ng| = 3) with
non-transferable utility and complete information. Let payoffs be given by:
Ui(g) ≡
∑
j∈1,...,n,j 6=i
δd(i,j;g)−1 (1 + ij)− |Ni(g)|,
where d(i, j; g) is the minimum distance between i and j in the graph g, 0 < δ < 1, ij
are unobservable (to the researcher) preference shocks and |Ni(g)| is the number of direct
connections of individual i in graph g. Assume that observed networks are pairwise stable.
For ij = ji, 0 < 23 < δ/(1− δ), we can represent the possible pairwise stable equilibria in
the space of unobservables as:
The approach above would produce on bounds on δ corresponding to the probability
that a particular network is pairwise stable (though possibly not unique) (upper bound)
and the probability that it is the unique pairwise stable network (lower bound). In the
figure above (which does not comprise the whole space for s), those bounds for the network
{12, 13} would be
P(12, 13 ≥ 0) ≥ P({12, 13}) ≥ P(12, 13 ≥ δ/(1− δ)),
21For additional strategies to handle the multiplicity problem, see de Paula (2013).
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and one could form similar bounds for all (= 8) possible networks (exploring the whole
space of unobservables). Unfortunately, while this might be conceivable when only three
individuals are involved, for even a moderate number of nodes, the number of networks
one would need to consider as potential equilibria is computationally intractable. With
more than 24 individuals, for instance, there are more potential networks than atoms in the
observable universe.
Given this dimensionality issue, one possible avenue to reduce the computational
burden is to focus on smaller subnetworks involving subgroups of individuals. Sheng (forth-
coming) develops this strategy in a model for undirected networks. She focusses on pairwise
stable networks (either with transferable and non-transferable utility, see previous defini-
tions) under complete information and a utility structure given by:
Ui(g) ≡
∑
j 6=i
Wij(u
θ
ij + ij) +
1
|Ng| − 2
∑
j 6=i
Wij
∑
k 6=i,j
Wjkν +
1
|Ng| − 2
∑
j,k 6=i
WijWkiWjkω.
As before, uθij ≡ u(Xi, Xj; θ) recrods the direct utility obtained from linking to other
individuals in the group, ν provides benefits to indirect friendships and ω indicates addi-
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tional payoff to having common connections also be linked to each other.22 The unobservable
random variables  are independent and follow a known distribution. (Since there are pref-
erence shocks for each potential link, isolated individuals are unlikely when |Ng|.) The data
is presumed to come from a sample of i.i.d. networks.
Pairwise stability (with either transferable utility or not) is determined by the marginal
utility of a link (∆Uij(g) = Ui(g)−Ui(g−ij) when ij ∈ g and ∆Uij(g) = Ui(g+ij)−Ui(g) when
ij /∈ g). Let then PS(∆U(X, )) denote the set of pairwise stable networks for realisations
of X and . The probability that one observes g is then given by:
P(g|X) = ∫
g∈PS(∆U(X,))∧|PS(∆U(X,)|=1 dF ()+∫
g∈PS(∆U(X,))∧|PS(∆U(X,)|>1 λ(g|PS(∆U(X, ))dF (),
where λ is the probability that g is selected for realisations of  that allow for multiple
pairwise stable networks. One can then emulate our previous discussion on empirical games
to generate bounds on the probability and guide the computation of identified parameter
sets. As previously discussed, these bounds are unfortunately computationally intractable for
even moderately sized networks. Instead, Sheng (forthcoming) suggests looking at subgraphs
on A ⊂ Ng nodes: the network gA comprising A and all edges in g linking those nodes. The
probability of observing such a subnetwork is then given by:
P(gA|X) =
∫
gA∈PSA(∆U(X,))∧|PSA(∆U(X,)|=1 dF ()+∫
gA∈PSA(∆U(X,))∧|PSA(∆U(X,)|>1
∑
g−A λ(gA|PS(∆U(X, ))dF (),
where the addition over g−A sums over the collection of complementary nodes (Ng\A) and
edges in g connecting them to each other and to nodes in A. PSA(∆U(X, )) is the subset
22In contrast to the utility specification in the begining of this chapter, the specification above normalises
the number of connections by |Ng| − 2 and allows for some double counting: if i, j and k are all connected,
each accrues benefits from direct connection with two individuals, indirect connections from each of the other
two and the fact that the other two are also linked to each other.
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of networks in A that are part of a network in PS(∆U(X, )). These deliver:
∫
gA∈PSA(∆U(X,))∧|PSA(∆U(X,)|=1
dF () ≤ P(gA|XA) ≤
∫
gA∈PSA(∆U(X,))
dF (),
where the upper bound is the probability that the subnetwork gA on nodes A pertains to a
pairwise stable network and the lower bound is the probability that the only subnetwork on
nodes A pertaining to a pairwise stable network is gA.
Consider for example the network formation game on three individuals presented
earlier in this subsection. For the subnetwork {12} on nodes 1 and 2, the upper bound is
given by the probability that 12 is greater than zero minus the probability for the triangular
region where only {23} is pairwise stable. In this region, {12} always pertains to a pairwise
stable network. The lower bound is given by the probability that 12 is greater than δ/(1+δ)
and 13 is greater than zero plus the probability that 13 is less than zero minus the subregions
where {23} is also a pairwise stable network. In this region, {12} is the only network on
nodes 1 and 2 that is part of a pairwise stable network is {12} (even though there are multiple
pairwise stable networks in the region where 12 is greater than δ/(1− δ) and 13 is between
zero and δ/(1− δ).
In the article, Sheng imposes (exchangeability) restrictions (on equilibrium selection
and payoff primitives) that guarantee that these bounds are nontrivial even as the number of
individuals in the groups gets larger. Among of other things, such (exchangeability) restric-
tions also imply a dense network (as in Mele (2017)): the total number of links is Op(N
2)
(see, e.g., Orbanz and Roy (2015)). While the sets above are not sharp, i.e., more infor-
mative bounds on the parameters can intuitively be obtained by considering subnetworks
on a larger number of nodes, they are potentially computable.23 The article offers a com-
putational algorithm to perform such computation and indicates a few additional potential
23Previous versions of the article, as the one reviewed in de Paula (2017)) also considered
simpler bounds: P(WA = wA|XA) ≤
∫
∃W−A:wA∈PS(∆UA(W−A,XA,A)) dF (A) and P(gA|XA) ≥∫
∀g−A:gA∈PS(∆UA(g−A,XA,A))∧|PSA(∆UA(g−A,XA,A)|=1 dF (A). In words, the upper bound for P(gA|XA) is
the probability that subnetwork gA is pairwise stable for some g−A and the lower bound is the probability
that, for any g−A, only subnetwork gA is pairwise stable. These bounds do not require pairwise stability on
the rest of the network and are thus easier to compute, but are less informative than the ones above and
might yield trivial bounds for larger groups.
29
simplifications. For example, when ν and ω are nonnegative (which guarantees existence of
pairwise stable networks when utility is non-transferable), the game is supermodular and the
solution set possesses a maximal and a minimal element. This can be leveraged to reduce the
computational complexities here as done by Miyauchi (2016) (also in the context of pairwise
stable network formation) and other authors in the empirical games literature. A Monte
Carlo study in the paper demonstrates the performance of the algorithm in a transferable
utility context with 50 and 100 networks varying in size from 25 individuals to 100.
Another use of subnetworks to circumvent the challenges presented in this setting
appears in de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer (2018). The article works on a complete
information, non-transferable utility model using pairwise stability as the solution concept.
The treatment is tailored to handle large networks and Ng is an uncountable set with con-
tinuum cardinality, taken to be an approximation for a large group of individuals. The
approach described here starts with a “large” network. Related approaches, also focussed
on large networks, but taken as limits for finite sequences of networks is given in Leung
(2015a), Menzel (2016) and Boucher and Mourifie´ (2017). To capture sparsity, they restrict
payoffs, allowing only for a finite number of links L such that in equilibrium one obtains
a bounded degree graph on the continuum (sometimes referred to as a graphing). Utilities
are also assumed to depend only on individual characteristics (and not identities) and on
indirect connections only up to a finite distance (depth D). This allows one to focus on
“network types” defined by one’s local neighbourhood, whose cardinality is potentially more
manageable than that of networks on individual nodes.
To illustrate the strategy, consider a very simple network formation game where
individuals can only form one link and their utility depends only on this link. Here, both L
and D are one. Nodes are characterised by X, which takes two values, B or W and there
is a continuum of individuals of each type µB and µW . Outcomes are thus given by ordered
pairs (x, y), where x is the individual’s characteristic and y, her connection’s characteristic.
Utilities are given by
Ui(g) ≡ uxy + i(y),
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where again xmarks the individual’s charateristic and y, her counterpart. If no link is formed,
the payoff is normalised to zero. Hence, there are four parameters (fx,y, x, y ∈ {B,W} and
two preference shocks for each individual: i(B) and i(W ).
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The paper defines network types as the local network surrounding an individual in
an observed network. Given the payoff structure, the network type should record payoff-
relevant connections. In this simple individual, the relevant network type is given by the
pair (x, y). In a more general setting a network type is characterised by the individual
herself, her direct connections, their direct connections and so on together with each of these
nodes characteristics up to the payoff depth D. This thus corresponds to a network on up
to 1 + L + L(L − 1) + · · · + L(L − 1)D−1 = 1 + L∑Dd=1(L − 1)d−1 nodes and is equal to 2
when L = 1. The proportion of individuals of each network type is an equilibrium outcome
and one would like to verify which parameter values rationalise the type shares in the data
as outcomes of a pairwise stable network.
To do this, the article classifies individuals based on which network types they would
not reject. Depending on the preference shocks, a B individual may be content to have a W
connection (fBW + i(W ) > 0), but not a B connection (fBB + i(B) < 0). In this case, this
individual would not have network type BB in equilibrium as this would contradict pairwise
stability, but would be content to be BW or, should there be no W individuals to link to,
to remain isolated as B0. The authors thus form preference classes collecting all types that
would be acceptable to an individual with given realisations of the preference shocks. In this
simple example, the preference class for the individual above would be {BB,B0}. (Since
there are no connections to be dropped from an isolated network type, the isolated type is
an element for every preference class.)
As in the empirical games discussion and the example earlier in this subsection, this
corresponds to a partition of the space of unobservable shocks, but only for the individ-
ual. Given a distribution for the preference shocks , one can compute (either analytically
or numerically) the probability of each preference class for a given individual at a partic-
24Additional restrictions are imposed on the preference shocks so that in equilibrium, even in large net-
works, there are isolated individuals.
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ular parameter value. One can then stipulate how individuals in each preference class are
allocated to network types. In the paper, this is done using allocation parameters desig-
nating the proportion of individuals in a particular preference class that are allocated to
a network type. In the example above, there are four preference classes for a B individ-
ual: H1 = {B0}, H2 = {B0, BB}, H3 = {B0, BW} and H4 = {B0, BB,BW}. Letting
αH(t) denote the allocation proportion of individuals in preference class H to type t, the
predicted share of BW individuals is given by P(H1|B)αH1(BW ) + P(H2|B)αH2(BW ) +
P(H3|B)αH3(BW ) +P(H4|B)αH4(BW ) multiplied by the proportion of B individuals in the
group.
The key here is to offer restriction on the allocation parameters αH(t) to be satisfied
for a given profile of network type shares to be consistent with pairwise stability. These
restrictions are necessary conditions for pairwise stability in the article. For example, nodes
can only be allocated to network types that pertain to their preference class: if t /∈ H,
αH(t) = 0. This corresponds to the condition that links have to be beneficial to both
individuals and would have αH1(BW ) = αH2(BW ) = 0. Second, given any pair of network
types that could feasibly add a link to each other (i.e., an isolated individual of either
characteristic, B or W , in the example), the measure of individuals who would prefer to
do so must be zero for at least one of the types. This corresponds to the condition that
non-existing links have to be detrimental to at least one of the individuals. Another way
to express this condition is to require that the product of the measure of individuals of one
type that would benefit from adding links to individuals of the other type must be zero.
This translates into a quadratic objective function which in equilibrium has to be zero once
allocation parameters are adequately chosen. Finally, the predicted proportions of network
types ought to match the observed proportions of types in the ntwork, which in turn defines
a set of linear constraints.
Once these are put together, one can express the task of verifying whether a given
parameter vector can rationalise the data (observed network type shares) as that of a pairwise
stable network as a quadratic programme on the allocation parameters with constraints
requiring those parameters to be positive, add up to one and for predicted shares to be
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matched in the data. Should the data be rationalised as a pairwise stable network for a
given parameter vector, the optimised objective function is zero. The cardinality of the
problem, while still non-trivial, is related to the cardinality of the preferece classes and
network types rather than the potential networks on |Ng| individuals. If this is done at each
putative parameter, one can then collect those parameters that rationalise the data and form
the identified set. Whereas the quadratic programme above is regrettably not a convex one
(since the matrix in the quadratic form is not necessaritly positive definite), the article offers
simulation evidence for networks as large as |Ng| = 500. Anderson and Richards-Shubik
(2019) applies this framework to the analysis of co-authorships in Economics.25
One interesting point to note refers to the source of statistical uncertainty here. Since
there are infinitely many nodes, were the network to be completely observed, network type
shares would be perfectly measured. On the other hand, if there is sampling uncertainty in
the measurement of network type shares because only a sample of individuals (and their net-
work types) is collected, sampling uncertainty in type shares would transfer to the estimation
of structural parameters. This relates to what is sometimes referred to as a “design-based”
paradigm in statistics (see Kolaczyk (2009)). The randomness here obtains from the proba-
bility ascribed by the survey scheme to the sampling of the various individuals in the network.
The partial observability of the network is nonetheless not uncommon and rather the norm
in many settings.26
5 Discussion
The study of network formation models is an active area of research. While this survey
presents a selective collection of recent developments in the field, several research questions
of interest remain and provide a brief discussion for some of those in what follows.
Since networks mediate and have their formation informed by several outcomes of
interest, econometric methods articulating both are potentially important in several areas.
25The article also offers a method to account for sampling uncertainty in the type shares.
26Since also focussed on subnetworks, the approach in Sheng (forthcoming) may also be adapted to such
contexts.
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Among the studies modelling the formation of networks as well as outcomes influenced by
them, see for example Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) and Hsieh and Lee (2016) (us-
ing a dyadic network formation model and focussed on educational achievement), Gilleskie
and Zhang (2009) (using Bayes Nash network formation and focussed on smoking initiation),
Badev (2018) and Hsieh, Lee, and Boucher (2019) (using exponential random graph network
formation models along the lines of Mele (2017), focussing on smoking and, for the latter,
also academic achievement).27 Multiplicity is not a salient issue in the econometric network
formation protocols in those works (or in the econometric system of equations determin-
ing outcomes there). This nonetheless remains a possiblity in other (strategic interaction
or conditionally specified) econometric models of network formation. Multiplicity is also
possible in nonlinear systems determining outcomes given networks. In those cases, partial
identification in either stage (i.e., network formation or interactions) may be transmitted to
other parameters in the model. This point is illustrated, for example, in the context of an
empirical entry-exit game in industrial organization with potentially multiple equilibria by
Ciliberto, Murry, and Tamer (2018).28
Relatedly, there is also scope to expand on the catalog of equilibrium notions de-
pending on the protocol for outcome determination and empirical setting of interest. For
instance, Ho and Lee (2019) (see also Ghili (2018) and Liebman (2018)) articulate network
formation and a bargaining framework due to Horn and Wolinsky (1988) to examine inter-
actions between hospitals and insurers in the United States. Econometric analysis (and, to
a certain extent, theoretical developments) around these and related models remain an area
of interest.
Finally, the network itself may be an outcome of interest in a treatment effects context
where programmes may lead to changes in the network, which in turn may modulate other
outcomes of concern. Comola and Prina (2019), for example, study the effect of a savings
product in Nepal on consumption through a randomised field experiment.29 They find that
27For an exposition on econometric methods for outcomes modulated by (predetermined) networks, see
Bramoulle´, Djebbari, and Fortin (2020) on this volume.
28Previous versions of this paper were circulated as “Inference on Market Power in Markets with Multiple
Equilibria.”
29This article was previously circulated as “Do Interventions Change the Network? A Dynamic Peer Effect
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insurance-motivated connections are likely to be rewired after the intervention and taking this
into account may improve one’s understanding of the programme’s effect on consumption.
They offer a treatment response framework on which to analyse this phenomenon and further
econometrics work on networks in a potential outcomes setting (possibly also accounting for
issues such as multiplicity) would also be a useful area of study.
Model Accounting for Network Changes”
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